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et al.: Discovery of an Insured's Statement to the Agent of His Insurer i

DISCOVERY OF AN INSURED'S STATEMENT
TO THE AGENT OF HIS INSURER IN AN
ACCIDENT REPORT SITUATION
INTRODUCTION

Open discovery became a reality for the federal courts in 1938
with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the scope of discovery regarding documents prepared prior to
trial remained largely undefined until 1947 when the Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor' held that non-party witness statements
collected prior to trial were not within the scope of the attorneyclient privilege. The Court did hold that such statements were
discoverable only upon a showing of "good cause" because they were
included in the "work product" of the attorney. 2 Later decisions by
the federal courts have extended the rationale of Hickman3 to allow
the discovery of defendants' statements 4 and plaintiffs' statements 5
given to a defendant's attorney for use at trial. The federal courts
have also permitted the discovery of a defendant's statement concerning the facts of an accident given to the agent of his6 insurer for
transmission to an attorney in the event of litigation.
As state legislatures have revised discovery procedures to
provide for broader pre-trial discovery, the state courts have
generally followed the lead of the federal courts in allowing
discovery of witnesses' 7 and plaintiffs' statements8 given to an attorney
1. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2. Id. at 508.
3. Id.
4. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969); Groover, Christie &
Merritt v. Lo Bianco, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Allmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949); Fort
Howard Paper Co. v. Affiliated F.M.I. Co., 64 F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Tiernan v.
Westext Transport, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 3 (D.R.I. 1969); Cummings v. Bell Tel. Co., 47
F.R.D. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
5. New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957); Shupe v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 19 F.R.D. 144 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Gordon v. Robinson, 109 F. Supp.
106 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Viront v. Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R., 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio
1950).
6. Jackson v. Froblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 134 (N.D.W. Va.
1970); Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959); Martin v. Nederlandsche
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatchappij, 8 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
7. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1961); Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 194 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Monroe, 276 So. 2d 547 (Fla. App. 1973); Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Daugherty, 111 Ga. App. 144,141 S.E.2d 112 (1965); Wilson v. Borchard,
370 Mich. 404, 122 N.W.2d 57 (1963); Reynolds v. Boston & Maine Transport Co., 98 N.H.
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or the agent of an insurer for use in litigation. In contrast to the
federal rule, a long line of state court decisions has held that under
the proper circumstances, a defendant's statement given to the
agent of his insurer is immune from discovery as a privileged
communication between attorney and client. 9 These decisions rely
on the logic of the traditional rule that a client may utilize an agent
for the communication of privileged information to his attorney. 10
Thus, whenever the federal courts allow the discovery of a defendant's statement to the agent of his insurer upon a showing of good
cause, the majority of state courts provide an absolute bar to the
discovery of such statements.
The purpose of this note is to compare the reasoning behind
these contrasting state and federal court rules, while analyzing each
in light of the traditional view of the attorney-client privilege.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The basis for the early English rule permitting the attorneyclient privilege was the oath and honor of the attorney to keep his
client's secrets. During the eighteenth century, courts began to
regard the ascertainment of truth more highly than an attorney's
251, 98 A:.2d 157(1953); Norderde v. Pennsylvania R.R., 73 N.J. Super. 74, 170 A.2d 71
(1962); Poppo v. Long Island R.R., 14 Misc. 2d 499, 183 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1958); Medic
Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. McAdams, 216 Tenn. 304, 392 S.W.2d 103 (1965). Witness
statements collected by an attorney or agent of the insurer may be included within
the work product privilege of the attorney.
8. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954); Clark v.
Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 2d 577, 2 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1960); Korhorn v. Smith, 33
Ill. App. 3d 532, 278 N.E.2d 864 (1971); Oberkircher v. Chicago Transit Auth., 41 Ill.
App. 2d 68, 190 N.E.2d 170 (1963); Schill v. Hammett, 18 Misc. 2d 87, 187 N.Y.S.2d
527 (1959); Meehan v. McClory, 266 App. Div. 706, 40 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1943); Koller v.
W.E. Plechaty Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 57, 216 N.E.2d 399 (1965); Walsh v. Northland
Greyhound Lines, 244 Wis. 281, 12 N.W.2d 20 (1943). State courts may also include
plaintiffs' statements collected by an attorney or agent of the defendant within the
work product privilege of the attorney.
9. Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567
(1959); Bellman v. District Court, Colo. _
531 P.2d 632 (1975); Wise v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d
133 (Fla. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Willaims, 21 Ga. App. 453,94 S.E. 584 (1917);
People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964); Koch v. Mettler, 49 Ill. App. 2d
251, 199 N.E.2d 417 (1964); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942);
Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973); In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St.
187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906);
Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Gass v. Baggerly,
332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App. 1960); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25
S.E.2d 352 (1943).
10. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as WIGMORE].
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professional dignity. This shift in emphasis undermined the
traditional justification offered for the attorney-client privilege. As
a result, a new basis for the privilege had to be offered." Since the
law had reached such a state of complexity, it was generally
proposed that a private person had great need of a skilled attorney
in order to exercise his legal rights. This argument assumed that
full disclosure between attorney and client was necessary for the
effective operation of the legal system, and that such disclosure
could be achieved only by guaranteeing that the client's confidences
would be privileged.12 This is the most frequently invoked basis for
the modern attorney-client privilege. It is generally assumed that
the benefit to justice from a full disclosure of the true facts between
attorney and client outweighs the harm caused by the lack of full
disclosure in court.13 Wigmore has summarized the attorney-client
privilege and its elements:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such (3) the
communications relating to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client (6) are at his instance permanently
the legal
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
4
advisor (8) except that protection be waiyed.1
Traditionally, privileged communications 15 between attorney and
client, whether written or oral,' 6 have been immune from discovery.
The privilege has not been well received by all legal scholars.
Wigmore himself, while defending the privilege, has admitted that
"its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete. ' 17 Some authors have set aside all of the purported
11. Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,the
Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235, 236 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as The Lawyer-Client Privilege].
12. See Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876);
Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. 175, 192 (1865).
13. Id.
supra note 10, at § 2292.
14. 'IGMORE,

15. Id. at § 2285. Wigmore points out that any privileged communication,
whether between attorney and client or otherwise, must satisfy four prerequisites: (1)
the communication must originate in confidence that it will not be disclosed; (2) the
element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relationship between the parties; (3) the relationship must be one which the
community wishes to protect; and, (4) any injury to the relationship due to disclosure
of the communication must be greater than the benefit gained in court by disclosure.
16. See Lynde v. Judd, 3 Day 499 (Conn. 1807); Nelson v. Becker, 32 Neb. 99,
48 N.W. 962 (1891); Seldon v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 42 N.W. 218 (1889).
17.

WIGMORE, supra note 10, at 557.
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justifications for the privilege and have suggested that the only
reason for the perpetuation of the rule is a sentimental distastefulness to the bench, bar and laity of a forced breach of the lawyerclient confidence.' 8 Some virtue has been seen in the tendency of the
privilege to discourage litigation. Supposedly, when the attorney
learns of all the facts within the client's knowledge he is able to
discover groundless claims and prevent their prosecution. 19 This
reasoning has been challenged by those who feel the privilege tends
to foster litigation. They point out that it is possible for a dishonest
client, after discovery of the attorney's opinion, to alter the facts and
resubmit them to a new attorney and thus be protected from
exposure by the first attorney because of the privilege. 20
Consequently, the privilege has been construed restrictively and
denied wherever the costs were unusually high, or wherever the
benefits-in terms of encouraging communications with counselwere particularly slight.21 As a result, the courts have placed
several limitations on the privilege. It is usually accepted that the
presence of a third person will destroy the privilege, unless the third
person is an agent of the attorney or client and is reasonably
necessary for the function of either. 22 This limitation is fundamental
because the privilege is meant to protect only confidential communications. The policy reasons for prohibiting disclosure cease to exist
when the client does not appear to desire secrecy. 23 Thus,
disclosure of the communication to a third party not acting as an
agent of the attorney or client will destroy the confidentiality and
24
the privilege.
The fact that disclosure to an agent of the attorney or client will
not destroy the privilege is a concession by the courts to the
practicalities of everyday communications. A client's freedom of
communication may require the employment of some other means
besides face-to-face contact for the transmission of information to an
attorney. Therefore, communications by almost any form of agency
employed or set in motion by the client are within the privilege. 25
18. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (2d ed. 1972); Radin, The
Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L.
REv. 487, 496 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Radin].
19. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2291.
20. Radin, supra note 18, at 490.
21. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2291.
22. Id. at § 2381.
23. Id.
24. See Edison Elec. Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 F. 294,
298 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
25. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2317. Wigmore treats the matter very
simply. He states that the communications of the attorney's agent to the attorney are
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The simplest examples of agency are those of a client sending a
letter through the mail or a message by word of mouth through a
confidential agent.
A corollary of the agency rule is the necessary party rule. Simply
stated it means that the privileged communications may pass only
through the hands (or minds) of those agents reasonably necessary
for its transmission to the attorney. 26 Disclosure on such a strictly
"need to know" basis will not destroy the privilege. 27
It is also well settled that a communication which originates
independently of the attorney-client relationship is not privileged
and will not become so if later entrusted to an attorney. 28 This is the
classic distinction between "pre-existing" papers and "communicating" papers. A document prepared prior to and not for the
purpose of legal consultation is a pre-existing paper and is not
privileged. Such pre-existing papers do not contain confidential
matters stimulated by the attorney and are not privileged in the
attorney's hands if they were not so in the client's. 29 This rationale is
often used to deny the privilege to business records which were
created long before any threatened litigation and then were transferred to an attorney in an attempt to avoid discovery. Once the person seeking discovery demonstrates that the particular record is one
which the organization ordinarily maintains without regard to legal
advice, it is prima facie the equivalent of a pre-existing record. As
such it would be not privileged. 0 As one author has pointed out, "if
the mere fact of possession by the attorney were sufficient to raise the
privilege, any documentary evidence . . .could be given into an
within the privilege because his agents are the sub-agents of the client and as such
are acting for the client.
26. See Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 7 So. 302 (1890); Schmitt v. Emery, 211
Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31
A. 245 (1895). See also Gardner, Agency Problems in the Law of Attorney-Client
Privilege:Privilege and Work Product Under Open Discovery (PartI), 42 U. Det. L.J.
105, 135 (1964); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to the Corporation,
65 YALE L.J. 953, 955 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Simon]. Simon says that in deciding
the question of allowable agency, the presence or absence of a reasonable necessity
would be an important factor.
27. Some courts have adopted a more liberal view that the report may be
disclosed to other interested agents without the privilege being destroyed. See United
States v. Aluminum Co., 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); Jessup v. Superior Court,
151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (1957).
28. Grant & Burlington v. United States, 277 U.S. 74 (1913); Edison Elec.
Light Co. v. United States Elec. Lighting Co., 44 F. 294, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1890);
Parkhurst v. City of Cleveland, 77 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
29. Simon, supra note 26, at 978.
30. Id. at 981.
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attorney's keeping... in order to avoid an order of discovery or notice
to produce."31
THE THREE TESTS FOR PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

A major problem arises in determining whether the document
was created with a view toward litigation. Three tests have been
developed by the courts to aid in this determination. Not surprisingly, the tests vary in strictness, and consequently the state and
federal courts are in disagreement as to the proper test to be applied.

The majority of state courts favor the more recently developed
dominant purpose test 32 over the anticipation of litigation test, while
33
the federal courts favor the older sole purpose test.
The Anticipation of Litigation Test
The anticipation of litigation test is based on the proposition that
communications originating with the client and transmitted to the

attorney with a view toward their use at trial are privileged
communications between attorney and client.34 The problem arises
in trying to interpret the term "in anticipation of litigation." At least
one court has held that statements can be prepared in anticipation

of litigation regardless of whether litigation has in fact commenced
or the attorneys to whom the signed statements are intended to be
transmitted have been selected. 35 Other courts have adopted the

English rule that a mere possibility of future litigation will satisfy
the test.

6

31. Note, Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Documentary Evidence
Originating with Client's Agent, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 467, 468 (1940). See People v.
Minkowitz, 220 N.Y. 399, 115 N.E. 987 (1917); Jackson v. Burtis, 14 Johns 390 (N.Y.
1817).
32. See note 9 supra.
33. See note 4 supra.
34. Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 194 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963);
Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Atlantic Coastline R.R.
v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S.E. 584 (1917); Watson v. Detroit Free Press, 248
Mich. 237, 226 N.W. 854 (1929); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413
(1942); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Davenport Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181
Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
35. Atlas Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 532, 210
Cal. App. 2d 15 (1962); Gene Compton's Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 250,
205 Cal. App. 2d 432 (1962); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949).
36. Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87
N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949). In England the practical effect of this requirement has been
eliminated where accident reports are concerned. The English rule is that litigation
is threatened at the very moment an accident occurs. See Seabrook v. British Transp.
Comm., 2 All E.R. 15 (Q.B. 1959).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss1/4

et al.: Discovery of an Insured's Statement to the Agent of His Insurer i
1976]

ACCIDENT REPORT SITUATION

The test itself has been severely criticized for extending the
privilege to defendant's statements rendered to the insurer as a
matter of routine, litigation being viewed as a possibility in every
accident report situation.3 7 Other criticism has centered on the
temporal factor of the test.3 8 It is quite plausible that a statement
could be taken years in advance of any litigation and still be
prepared with the intent of using it at trial at some future date. This
extended time period makes proof of intention more difficult,
especially where the client fails to turn the materials over to the
attorney and merely stores them with other papers or documents of
a non-privileged nature. This problem is not insignificant in view of
the fact that the dominant motive behind all three tests is to deny the
privilege to ordinary business records later transferred to an
attorney.3 9
Proponents of this test emphasize the fact that litigation arises
from accident reports more often than from the subject matter of
other business reports. 40 The name of the test itself implies a
situation in which the privilege is often applicable. 41 Despite these
arguments, the majority of state courts have interpreted the test to
suit their goals by holding that the mere possibility of future
litigation will satisfy the test. 42
The Sole Purpose Test
To establish the fact that a communication was made for the
purpose of solicting legal advice and was not simply a pre-existing
document, several of the earlier state court rulings required that the
communication originate either at the instance of the attorney or for
the "sole purpose" of being laid before counsel. 43 Thus, a defendant's
statement to his insurer would fall into one of two categories: (1) a
statement which came into being solely for the purpose of communicating information to the attorney; or (2) a statement which originated
37. Simon, supra note 26, at 980.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 960.
40. Comment, Agent's Reports and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 752, 768 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Agent's Reports 1].
41. Id.
42. One author points out that to the extent that state accident report cases
tend to make imminence of litigation an absolute prerequisite, they are crossing over
into the area of work product. See Simon, supra note 26, at 980. See also note 92
infra.
43. Wise v. Western Union. Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935);
Davis v. Columbia Gas & Electric Co., 68 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio C.P. 1938); Davenport Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Robertson v. Commonwealth,
181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
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for, serves purposes other than that of communicating with a lawyer.
Under the "sole purpose" test only the former category would be
protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege. The fact
that the defendant's statement pre-dated the attorney-client relation44
ship would not be decisive.
Arguably, this is consistent with the policy reasons behind the
privilege. If a statement is taken solely for eventual transmission to
an attorney, the fact that no attorney-client relationship exists will
not preclude it from containing the type of information which the
privilege seeks to protect. 45 While the "sole purpose" test has fallen
into disfavor with the majority of state courts, at least one author
has felt it to be the most valid test in terms of limiting the attorneyclient privilege to its proper scope. 46 That author emphasizes that
this test most closely approximates the narrow scope of the tradi47
tional privilege in regard to communications through an agent.
Other critics of this test have noted that if any part of the client's
purpose in creating the communication was to lay it before an
attorney then the document may not have been made but for reliance
on the privilege and should be protected from disclosure. 48 The trend
in recent state court decisions has been to shun the strictness of the
"sole purpose" approach in favor of the broader and more easily
administered "dominant purpose" test.
Succinctly stated, the dominant purpose test holds:
If it appears that the communication is to serve a dual
purpose, one for transmittal to an attorney in the course of
professional employment and one not related to that
purpose, the question presented to the trial court is as to
49
which purpose predominates.
If the dominant purpose for the creation of the statement is for
communication with an attorney the whole of the document will be
privileged. 50 Under this test, the transmission of the defendant's
44. Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895).
45. Agent's Reports, supra note 40, at 756.
46. Gardner, A PersonalPrivilegefor Communications of Corporate ClientsParadox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 389 (1963) [hereinafter cited as

Gardner].
47. Id.
48. The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 11, at 245.
49. Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567,
573 (1959).
50. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954); 1 MARTON,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 98 (1914).
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statement to his attorney through the agency of the insurer would
not destroy the privilege even when the insurer made incidental use
of the statement for bookkeeping purposes. 51
Two basic criticisms of this test have developed. First, if a
statement is taken by the insurer's agent for reasons in addition to
later use by an attorney, the statement usually would have been
made regardless of the privilege and no reason would exist for
its application. In the typical accident report situation, the absence
of the privilege would not change the defendant's decision to give a
statement to his insurer.52 Thus, the better rule would be that when
the defendant's statement is given for a dual purpose, one of which
is not privileged, the policy favoring discovery should prevail,5 3 or at
least only that part of the statement which came into existence for
the sole purpose of attorney-client communication should be
protected. 54
The second major criticism involves the fact that unnecessary
parties are involved in the transmission from insured to the
attorney, and this destroys the required confidentiality of the
statement. 55 In its long and complicated 56 route from the insured to
51. Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025, 1030 (1954).
52. Agent's Reports, supra note 40, at 754.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court held that where a communication is only partially privileged
on its face the whole will be denied the privilege if the claimant does not indicate
which segments of the communication fall within the privilege. This seems to be
consistent with the doctrine that the party asserting the privilege must allege facts
sufficient to bring himself within the doctrine. But see United States v. United Shoe
Machine Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), in which the court held in reference
to communications from the corporations' house attorney to independent lawyers
that,
the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a communication which also
includes legal advice... [s]uch parts of them are privileged as contain, or
have opinions based on, information furnished by an officer or employee
of the defendant in confidence and without the presence of third persons.
Id. at 359.
55. Gardner, supra note 46, at 368.
56. Id. at 362-365. Gardner gives a brief narrative of the history of a
statement from the time it leaves the insured until the time it reaches an attorney. A
short summary may be helpful to the uninitiated. As soon as the insured notifies the
insurer or his agent of the accident, his statement of the facts will be taken. The
insured will be warned of his duty to cooperate; he will be examined as to other
sources of information; and he will be instructed not to discuss the matter with
anyone representing the adverse party. If no settlement is reached at this stage the
statement will be forwarded to the main office of the insurance carrier for that
claims district. There it will be received by the district claims manager. If the
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the defense counsel, the defendant's statement will be handled by
many persons, frequently will be disclosed to third parties, and
undoubtedly will be copied and distributed within the insurance
company. Policing this type of situation in order to insure that only
necessary parties are involved in the transmission of the statement
would involve complex and time-consuming administrative problems
for the courts. According to this view, these disclosures justify a
8 7
denial of privilege to the defendant's statements.
These administrative problems become much more critical
when both parties to the accident are insured by a common
insurer.58 This situation arose in Monier v. Chamberlain.59 Both
parties gave statements to the agent of their insurer containing
their version of the accident. When discovery of the defendant's
statement was later sought by the plaintiff, the court stated:
[We] believe that one of the essential conditions precedent
to the attachment of the attorney-client privilege, i.e., that
the communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed, cannot be said to exist. Making
a statement to an agent who is also . . . an agent for a
potential adversary is scarcely the type of communication
contemplated by the privilege. 60
In a common insurer situation the denial of the privilege seems
proper. Both parties are bound by the cooperation clauses of their
insurance contracts to provide all relevant information or risk the
loss of coverage.6 1 In order to protect the confidentiality of the
statements in this fact situation the courts would be forced to police
the internal workings of the insurer to ensure that it does not serve
its own ends by disclosing the statement of one party to the opposing
potential damages are large and evidence of liability is strong, the statement may be
examined by the entire managerial staff. However, this depends on the policy of the
particular company. As soon as a suit has been filed by the claimant, the original of
the defendant's statement will be forwarded to local counsel who will handle the
defense. The district claims office will retain one or more duplicates of the
statement. Id.
57. Id. at 367.
58. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 213 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 415-416. The court reaffirmed its holding in People v. Ryan, 30 Ill.
2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964), that the statement of a defendant to the agent of his
insurer for transmission to his attorney would be privileged. The court distinguished
Monier factually.
61. A failure to cooperate properly and promptly could result in a disclaimer

of liability by the insurer and a complete defense for breach of such condition. See
Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y.S. 271, 276, 160 N.E. 367, 369 (1953).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss1/4

et al.: Discovery of an Insured's Statement to the Agent of His Insurer i

19761

ACCIDENT REPORT SITUATION

attorney. The apparent impossibility of this task prompted the
statement
court in Monier to deny protection to the defendant's
62
insurer.
common
a
had
parties
where both
The strongest argument against recognizing the privilege in the
common insurer situation is the lack of an expectation of confidentiality in regard to the statements." Immediately after the accident
both parties will become aware that they have the same insurer.
Any expectation that their statements will remain confidential will
be much less than if each party has a different insurer and
gives his statement to a separate agent for transmission. It must be
noted, however, that even those courts which allow discovery of a
defendant's statement in the common insurer instance will not
necessarily allow discovery of the same statement in the ordinary
case.6" The majority of the state courts have held that when each
party has a separate insurer, a defendant's statement concerning the
accident which is given to the agent of the insurer for transmission
to an attorney in the event of possible litigation is given with an
intent and reasonable expectation that it remain confidential.
Moreover, transmission through the insurer should not destroy the
confidentiality of the statement because the insurer, even with all of
its clerks, executives and officers, acts as a "necessary party" in
transmitting the information to the attorney. 65 Thus, the statement is
immune from discovery as part of the attorney-client privilege."
62. Pace, Some Problems Which Arise When An Insurer Has Coverage on Both
Parties to An Accident, 1967 INs. L.J. 532 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Pace].
63. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 213 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
64. People v. Ryan, 30 11. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
65.

See note 26 supra.

66. Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567
Colo. - , 531 P.2d 632 (1975); Wise v.
(1959); Bellman v. District Court, Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133
(Fla. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S.E. 584 (1917);
People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964); Koch v. Mettler, 49 Ill. App. 2d
251, 199 N.E.2d 417 (1964); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942);
Brakhage v. Graft, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821,
87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949); In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); Ex
parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). Contra, Miller v.
Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alas. 1964); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ariz. 169, 398
P.2d 671 (1965); Jacques v. Cassidy, 28 Conn. Sup. 212, 257 A.2d 29 (1969); Alseike v.
Miller, 196 Kan. 547, 412 P.2d 1007 (1966); Wilson v. Borchard, 370 Mich. 404, 122
N.W.2d 57 (1963); Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964).
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Discovery in the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has generally been much broader than that allowed
under similar state discovery statutes. 67 However, following the
adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, the courts expressed no
immediate agreement as to the scope of permissible discovery in
regard to documents prepared by attorneys or agents of an insurer
prior to trial. Frequent refusal to require disclosure of witness
statements or pre-trial reports created a lack of uniformity in the
application of the rules. 68 It was not until after the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Hickman v. Taylor 9 that any degree of
consistency appeared in the decisions.
In Hickman, the client was a two-man partnership which had
retained an attorney in a suit related to an accident involving one of
its tugboats. 70 The attorney interviewed the crew members of the
tugboat and the plaintiff sought discovery of the written reports
and oral recollections of the interviews. The defendants
refused to produce the information requested on the grounds that it
was within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 71 The Supreme
Court declared that:
Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions prepared or obtained from interviews with witnesses by
counsel in preparing for litigation after a claim has arisen
are not within the attorney-client privilege and are not
72
protected from discovery on that basis.
However, the Court went on to hold that the witnesses' statements to
the lawyer were qualifiedly immune from discovery as the "work
product" of the lawyer. 73 Accordingly, the plaintiff would first have
to show "good cause" before discovery would be allowed.7 4 While
67. 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26.23 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
Moore]; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1845 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
68. Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparationsin the FederalCourts, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 1026, 1027 (1950); Winner, ProceduralMethods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D.
37 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Winner].
69. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 499.
72. Id. at 508.
73. Id.
74. Id. See also City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 214 F. Supp.
483 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Judge Kirkpatrick characterized the work product principle as

this:
It is very important to keep in mind the fact that the work product
principle is not and cannot properly be described as a privilege. Some
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Hickman is principally known for the qualified immunity rule, what
is of importance for this discussion is the Court's ruling that
statements of non-party witnesses, prepared by an attorney for use at
trial are not protected from discovery as part of the attorney-client
privilege.7 5 As a result, such statements lose their absolute protection from discovery. Instead, they become proper subjects of
76
discovery only after good cause is shown for their production.
The federal courts have reasoned that if Hickman held that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply to non-party witness state-

ments, even when taken by an attorney in anticipation of litigation,
then defendants' statements given to an agent of the insurer for
transmission to an attorney for possible use at trial are not within the
protection of the attorney-client privilege. Such has been the holding
of the majority of federal courts. 77 That the insurer actually turns the
statements over to an attorney for use in defending the insured does
not render the statements privileged. 78 Discovery has also been
allowed in the federal courts of a plaintiffs own statement of the facts
concerning an accident when it is given to the agent of the
defendant's insurer. 79 Thus, the federal courts generally hold that
witness statements, plaintiff statements and defendant statements

given to an agent of an insurer are not included within the scope of
the attorney-client privilege, and are subject to discovery under the
proper conditions.

80

courts have confused the situation by calling it a qualified privilege, but
it is not a privilege at all; it is merely a requirement that very good cause
be shown if the disclosure is made in the course of a lawyer's preparation
of a case.
Id. at 487. As to the good cause reouirement, see MOORE, supra note 68, at 26.23.
75. Since the district court sat en banc, no less than twenty-four federal
judges in three courts passed on the question and ruled against the common law
privilege. Cf. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 59 HARV. L. REV. 418, 518 (1946).
76. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
77. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969); Groover, Christie &
Merritt v. Lo Bianco, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Southern Ry. v. Campbell,
309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Allmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949);
Ford Howard Paper Co. v. Affiliated F.M.I. Co., 64 F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Marron v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 7 F.R.D. 660 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Colpak v. Hetternick, 40 F.
Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Price v.
Levitt, 29 F.Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Kulrich v. Murray, 28 F.Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
78. Price v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp.
498 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Colpak v. Hetternick, 40 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
79. New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957); Gordon v.
Robinson, 109 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Vivant v. Wheeling & Lake Erie R.,
10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Kirshner v. Palmer, 7 F.R.D. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
Bough v. Lee, 28 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
80. See notes 4, 42, 43, 44 supra and accompanying text.
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In formulating these opinions the federal courts have had
occasion to interpret the wording of Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Each of these rules is limited to
the discovery of matters "not privileged." 81 However, the words "not
privileged" in the federal rules mean not privileged under the
decisions of the federal courts.8 2 A state statute plainly stating that
such statements are part of the attorney-client privilege would be
given effect in a federal court diversity of citizenship action.
Generally the state statutes are not that precise in describing the
scope of discovery.
The rationale underlying these rulings as to the statements of
plaintiffs and non-party witnesses is sound. Non-party witnesses
and plaintiffs do not give their statements to the agent of the
defendant's insurer with the intention that they remain confidential.
In addition, neither the witness nor plaintiff will ever stand in an
attorney-client relationship with the lawyer eventually appointed to
defend the insured. s4
The more difficult question is whether a defendant's statement
given to the agent of his insurer for possible transmission to his
attorney in the event of litigation is sufficiently distinguishable from
the statement of a non-party witness or plaintiff to come within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege. The federal courts have
to defendants' staterefused to extend the attorney-client privilege
85
ments in the accident report situation.
81. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (1971).
82. Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Parella v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
83. See Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959) (lack of intended
confidentiality in witnesses' statement); Bough v. Lee, 29 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)
(lack of intended confidentiality in plaintiffs statement). See also Wigmore's four
prerequisites for privileged communications at note 15 supra.
84. Winner, supra note 34, at 40.
85. Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969); Groover, Christie &
Merritt v. LoBianco, 336 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Allmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949); Ford
Howard Paper Co. v. Affiliated F.M.I. Co., 64 F.R.D. 694 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Jackson v.
Kroblin Refrigerated XPress, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 134 (N.D.W. Va. 1970); Tiernan v.
Westext Transport, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 3 (D.R.I. 1969); Cummings v. Bell Tel. Co., 47
F.R.D. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959).
Compare, Burns v. Mulder, 20 F.R.D. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Meadows v. Southern Ry.,
14 F.R.D. 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Dennhardt v. Holman, 12 F.R.D. 79 (D. Colo. 1951);
Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Matthies v. Connolly Co.,
2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
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In support of this treatment, several reasons have been advanced.
First, the defendant's statement is not given to an attorney or
anyone acting in his behalf, nor does the defendant have an attorney
at the time the statement is given. 86 This argument by the federal
courts merely begs the question. Even under the sole purpose
test which the federal courts have approved it is possible for a
statement given under these conditions to be privileged. An
example would be husband dictating a note to his wife which she is
to deliver to an attorney. The information is clearly within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege even if the husband has no previous
dealings with the attorney to whom the note is delivered.8 7 It also
makes no difference that she is acting as an agent of her husband
rather than on behalf of the attorney-the privilege will still
attach.8s A more technical argument, but one with some validity,
would be that the insurance agent acts as the agent of the defendant,
and that the insurance premium paid by the defendant acted as a
retainer for the insurer's services in acquiring a lawyer. Thus, it
might be argued that the insured stands in the same position as a
person who has retained a law firm to represent him but who has
not as yet been assigned an individual attorney.
Secondly, in denying the privilege in an accident report situation the federal courts have felt that the holding in Hickman v.
Taylor implies that a defendant's statement given to the agent of an
insurer should receive no greater protection than statements of nonparty witnesses.8 9 However, this interpretation of Hickman is too
broad. There are two important distinctions between non-party
witness statements and defendant statements. Non-party witnesses
as in Hickman have no reasonable expectation that their statements
will remain confidential. On the contrary, they give their statements with the intention that they be revealed at some later time
and place. Non-party witnesses also have no contractual agreement
with the party interviewing them to see that their statement is
transmitted to an attorney representing them. Clearly, a defendant
making his statement to his insurer's agent has a reasonable
expectation that the contents will not be revealed to the opposing
party. The contractual obligation to act as the client's agent in
86. Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959); Price v. Levitt, 29 F.
Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). See WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 2286.
87. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at § 1786.
88. Id.
89. See Allmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), where the court
said that the rationale of Hickman v. Taylor, "has a much broader sweep and applies
to all statements of prospective witnesses. . .
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transmitting the information to an attorney only emphasizes the
intended confidentiality of the statement.
Lastly, the federal courts have stated that the attorney-client
privilege should be construed restrictively in the accident report
situation because the benefit from full disclosure is unusually high
and the harm, in terms of discouraging communication with
counsel, is slight.90 This premise is also questionable. The basic
policy reason supporting the existence of the attorney-client privilege is that it promotes full disclosure of the facts to the attorney
and this in turn assures the effective operation of our legal system.9 1
Denial of the privilege to a defendant in the accident report
situation would certainly result in a reluctance on the insured's part
to disclose the facts fully to his agent or attorney. Thus, the policy
reasons for recognizing the privilege here are just as significant as
in the traditional attorney-client relationship.
Consequently, the federal court position has been rejected by a
majority of the state courts which hold that the scope of the
attorney-client privilege includes statements given by the defendant
to the agent of his insurer for use by an attorney in any future
litigation.92
STATE COURT TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES

Generally, state courts will allow the discovery of a statement of
a non-party witness 93 or plaintiff" which was given to the agent of
90. The statement of a witness taken shortly after the accident has been
referred to as a "catalyst of unique value in the development of the truth through the
judicial process." De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
91. See note 12 supra.
92. Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567
(1959); Bellman v. District Court, Colo. _ 531 P.2d 632 (1975); Wise v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Vann v. State, 85 So.2d 133
(Fla. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94 S.E. 584 (1917);
People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964); Koch v. Mehler, 49 Ill. App. 2d
251, 199 N.E.2d 417 (1964); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942);
Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821,
87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949); In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); Ex
parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Davenport Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
166 Pa. 480, 31 A. 245 (1895); Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960);
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). Contra, Miller v.
Hampster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alas. 1964); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ariz. 169, 398
P.2d 671 (1965); Jacques v. Cassidy, 28 Conn. Sup. 212, 257 A.2d 29 (1969); Alseike v.
Miller, 196 Kan. 547, 412 P.2d 1007 (1966); Wilson v. Borchard, 370 Mich. 404, 122
N.W.2d 57 (1963); Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964).
93. Greyhound Corp. v. Merced County Superior Court, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1961); Reynolds v. Boston & Maine Transp. Co., 98 N.H. 251, 98 A.2d 157
(1953); Nordeide v. Pennsylvania R.R., 73 N.J. Super. 74, 179 A.2d 71 (1962); Cote v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 160 Misc. 658, 290 N.Y.S. 483 (1936).
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the defendant's insurer for use by an attorney in any subsequent
'litigation. Such statements will usually be included within the work
product of the attorney. Consequently, any discovery will be
contingent upon a showing of good cause. 95 These decisions have
been influenced by the holding in Hickman v. Taylor and the
arguments proposed by the federal courts regarding the lack of
intended confidentiality on the part of non-party witnesses and
plaintiffs.96 On the other hand, statements of defendants given to
agents of their insurers have received a different treatment. In
97
contrast to the federal rule, state court decisions based on statutory
and common law 98 authority have declared defendant's statements
to be protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.
Such documents have been held to be privileged even when they
remain in the insurer's files without even being transferred to an
attorney for use at trial. In maintaining the privileged status of
defendant's statements the state courts have shown versatility and
creativity: versatility in the interpretation of old theories to meet
new situations and creativity in developing new rules regarding
privileged communications. The following section will discuss the
rationale behind the majority state court rule in light of recent
decisions by several state supreme courts.
94. Clark v. Superior Court of State, 177 Cal. App. 2d 577,2 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1960);
Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954); Korham v. Smith, 33
Ill. App. 3d 532, 278 N.E.2d 864 (1971); Schill v. Hammett, 18 Misc. 2d 87, 187
N.Y.S.2d 527 (1959); Meehan v. McClory, 266 App. Div. 706, 40 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1943);
Koller v. W.E. Plechaty Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 57, 216 N.E.2d 399 (1965).
95. See MOORE, supra note 39, for definition of "good cause."
96. Greyhound Corp. v. Merced County Superior Court, 364 P.2d 266, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90 (1961).
97. Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949) (decided under §§

324, 353 of the

NEW YORK CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT).

See Doughty v. Greenburg, 43

Misc. 2d 267, 250 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1964) (decided under the new New York C.P.L.R. §
3101). The Doughty court held that a statement made prior to the time suit was
instituted is not a writing created in anticipation of litigation under § 3101(d) (2) and
is, therefore, subject to disclosure.
98. Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567
1958); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
99. Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), was decided under
Texas Code of Procedure Rule 167 which deals with instances in which the right to
production of documents is granted. The provision of this rule which makes
exceptions to the right of discovery states,
that the right herein granted shall not extend to the written communications passing between agents or representatives or the employees of
either party to the suit or communciations between any party and his
agent... where made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon
which the suit is based and made in connection with the prosecution or
defense of such claim or the circumstances out of which same has risen.
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Recent State Court Decisions
Despite the fact that the vast majority of states have passed
discovery statutes similar to those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the federal and state courts differ on the scope of "open"
discovery. 0 0 A prime example of these differences is the contrasting treatment afforded discovery motions concerning defendants' statements given to the agent of an insurer for possible use at
trial. The federal courts deny the privilege to such statements,
citing as authority the "sole purpose" test and lack of confidentiality.101 While the federal courts have generally included such
statements within the work product of the attorney, 1°2 immunity
under that rule can be overcome by a showing of a good cause.103
The majority of state courts have presented an absolute bar to
the discovery of such statements by including them within the
attorney-client privilege. 10 4 Most of the recent decisions have
followed the reasoning laid down in the early New York case of
Hollien v. Kaye. 0 5 In that case the court pointed out that compulsory liability insurance was becoming mandatory in most states and
that the terms of the insurance contract obligated the motorist to
make a full disclosure of the facts of any accident to his insurer. 06
Because of these two factors the court felt that the insured should
not be prevented from "unbosoming"'1 himself regarding an accident to the very entity which he had paid to protect his interests in the
event of just such an accident. 1 8 The court declared the defendant's
statement to be privileged in order to encourage full disclosure
between insured and insurer. Three other factors were noted by the
court: (1) the defendant's statement was intended as a confidential
communication to an attorney; (2) the delivery of the statement to the
insurer's agent deemed the insurer an agent of the defendant for the
purpose of transmitting the statement to an attorney; and (3) a
WIGMORE, supra note -10, at § 1859.
101. See Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959) (lack of confidentiality
destroys privilege); Colpak v. Hetternick, 40 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (statement
not for sole purpose of communicating with attorney).
102. See MOORE, supra note 68, at 26.23.
103. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See also Thomas v. The Red
Jacket, Inc., 16 F:R.D. 349, 351 (D. Mass. 1954), where the court said, "The
prohibition of the Hickman case is not an absolute one even as to the work product of
the lawyer himself."
100.

104.
105.

See note 94 supra.
194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1949).

106. Id. at 823, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
107. Id.
108.

Id.
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statement is taken in anticipation of litigation if it was taken at a time
when an action has been instituted or is likely to be instituted.0 9
Basically, the court used a broad interpretation of the anticipation of
litigation test and the agency rule of transmission to bring the
defendant's statement within the protection of the attorney-client
privilege. Apparently, it did this in order to protect the intent and
reasonable expectations of the insured. Other courts in the very
recent past have also thought these two interests to be worth
protecting.
In 1964,110 the Illinois Supreme Court faced the following fact
situation in People v. Ryan."' On February 18, 1961, the insured
was involved in an automobile/truck collision. Two days later she
made a statement to the investigator from her insurance company in
which she admitted consuming several bottles of beer just prior to
the accident. She was later charged with driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. On February 24, 1961, the insured
employed attorney to defend her in the criminal action. The attorney
subsequently obtained the written statement of the defendant and
was thereafter served with a subpoena for its production by the
county prosecutor. When the attorney refused to produce the
statement he was found in contempt of court and fined $100. An
2
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court on constitutional grounds"1
109. Id. at 824, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 785. See also note 61 supra.
110. The Illinois Supreme Court was not the only court faced with this issue in
1964. In that year the Supreme Court of Wisconsin overruled its decision in
Woiciechowski v. Brown, 274 Wis. 364, 80 N.W.2d 434 (1957), and held that the
statement of a defendant to the agent of his insurer for use by an attorney in the event
of litigation was not within the attorney-client privilege. Jacobi v. Podevels, 23 Wis. 2d
152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964). The decision was not made without some reluctance, as
evidenced by this statement of the opinion writer,
Recognizing that a policy choice must be made with respect to confidentiality of statements by an insured to the insurer, some of the
members of the court, including the writer of this opinion, would adhere
to Wojciechowski v. Brown, wherein the choice has previously been
made. ...

Id. at 75.
111. 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
112. People v. Ryan, 25 11. 2d 233, 184 N.E.2d 853 (1962). Ryan proposed that
the written statement was privileged and that compelling him to produce it would be
a violation of the client's constitutional right against self-incrimination. The court
responded that,
The privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one,
and it is well established that the papers and effects which the privilege
protects must be the private property of the person claiming the
privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.
Id. at 854.
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was denied and the case was transferred to the appellate court
where the trial court's ruling was affirmed." 3 Back on appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court the issues were (1) whether an insured's
written statement given to her liability insurance carrier's investigator regarding the details of such an accident was within the
attorney-client privilege, and (2) whether the transmission of such a
statement with her consent to the attorney defending her on
criminal charges arising out of the same accident constituted a
voluntary waiver of the privilege. In upholding the privileged
character of the statement and denying any waiver, the court said:
We concede that such communications are normally made
by the insured to a layman and in many cases no lawyer
will actually be retained for the purpose of defending the
insured .... [U]nder such circumstances we believe that the
insured may properly assume that the communication is
made to the insurer as an agent for the dominant purpose
of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of the
interests of the insured. We believe that the same
salutory reasons for the privilege as exist when the
communication is directly between the client and attorney
were present when [the insured] made her statement to
the investigator for her insurer. 114
The court went on to hold that in the absence of disclosure to a
person not in an attorney-client relationship with the insured there
was no waiver of the privilege." 5
The Ryan decision has at least three important aspects. First,
the court felt that the defendant's expectation that the statement
would remain confidential was worth protecting. Second, the court
adopted the more modern "dominant purpose" test in regard to
privileged communications. Third, a broad view of the anticipation of litigation test was accepted - so broad a view that the
113. People v. Ryan, 40 Ill. App. 2d 352, 189 N.E.2d 763 (1963). The appellate
court ruled that the insured's statement would be privileged while in the insurance
company's hands or if transmitted to the attorney of its choice for defense of the
insured. However, the court held that the privilege was waived when transmitted to
Ryan for use in the criminal proceeding - a use which the court thought was entirely
different from that which the statement was originally intended. Ryan was seen as a
third party to whom a privileged communication was revealed with the consent of

the client, thereby waiving the privilege.
114. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 458, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964).
115. Id.
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statement would have remained privileged even if it remained in
116
the insurer's files and had never been used in litigation.
In 1973, the Supreme Court of Nebraska followed the lead of
People v. Ryan by holding a defendant's statement to be within the
attorney-client privilege for the sole purpose of its discovery
statute. 117 The Nebraska court emphasized that the defendant's
statement was obtained in the performance of the insurer's obligation to investigate and settle or defend claims made against the
insured. The court also commented that the statement was intended
for the use of the attorneys eventually selected by the insurer for
11 8
defense of the insured.
The Supreme Court of Colorado considered the issue for the first
time in 1975.119 In that case the insured was involved in a
head-on collision in which one person was killed and two others
seriously injured. The insured was subsequently charged with
manslaughter, vehicular homicide, assault, vehicular assault and
driving while intoxicated.1 20 When the state attempted to discover a
statement which the insured had given to his insurer's investigator
immediately after the accident, the court, in a terse opinion, 121
declared the communication to be immune from discovery as part of
the privileged communications between attorney and client. 22 The
court emphasized the insured's contractual duty to fully cooperate
with the insurer; and the insurer's contractual obligation to defend
all suits arising out of the accident. 23 The state attempted to refute
the court's argument by pointing out that the legislature had spoken
fully and comprehensively on the subject of privilege and nowhere
in the discovery statute was it indicated that the attorney-client
116. A number of the early state accident report cases contain dicta that the
statement, to qualify as privileged, must ultimately be turned over to counsel and
remain in his possession. See Atchison, Topeka & S.F.R.R. v. Burks, 78 Kan. 515,526,
96 P. 950, 961 (1908); In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949).
117. Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45 (1973). The statute
involved read as follows: "Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore
the court may order the production of any document not privileged."
118. Brakhage v. Graff, 190 Neb. 53, 206 N.W.2d 45, 48 (1973).
119. Bellmann v. District Court, - Colo. 531 P.2d 632 (1975).
120. Both People v. Ryan and Bellmann v. District Court involved criminal
charges rather than civil. In neither case did the courts attempt to support their
decisions on this factor, but instead implied that their holdings would be the same in
the usual accident report situation.
121. The court made no mention of any constitutional issues revolving around
self-incrimination.
122. Bellmann v. District Court, Colo. 531 P.2d 632 (1975).
123.

Id.
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privilege encompassed this situation. 124 However, a majority of the
court did not adopt this argument. 125
REFLECTIONS

Those courts which refuse to recognize an attorney-client privilege in regard to a defendant's statement given to an agent of his
insurer for possible transmission to an attorney in the event of
litigation cite the following arguments:
1. Because the "sole purpose" of the statement is not
communication with the attorney, the policy favoring
126
disclosure should prevail.

2. The unnecessary parties involved in the communication of the statement between the client and attorney
destroy the confidentiality and thus the privileged character of the statement.

27

3. The argument that non-applicability of the privilege
would tend to restrict the full disclosure of facts to the
insurer is false. The insured is not always totally honest
with his insurer, especially where such honesty might
endanger his coverage. 128
4. The fact situation involves a contractual relationship
which is something less than the traditional relationship
124. The statute involved stated:
An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client, as to
any communications made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall an attorney's
secretary, stenographer or clerk be examined without the consent of his
employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired
in such capacity.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(lXb) (1973).
125. One judge dissented:
Not only does the court's construction go beyond the apparent intent of the
statute, but it is contrary in spirit to our civil and criminal rules of
discovery. Therefore, consistent with our discovery policies of openness so
that truth may be the ultimate goal of the judicial process, I would [deny the
privilege].
Bellmann v. District Court, - Colo. 531 P.2d 632, 635 (1975).
126. This argument is based upon the pre-existing documents rule. See Vann v.
State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956), In re Keough, 151 Ohio 307, 314, 85 N.E.2d 550, 553
(1949); In re Hyde, 149 Ohio 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948).
127. Gardner, supra note 46, at 369.
128. Pace, supra note 62, at 536-537.
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between attorney and client. Because this relationship
does not fit the traditional attorney-client role, the privilege should not be extended to protect the insured. 129
5. The principle of open discovery, as embodied in the
modern discovery statutes, constitutes the legislative recognition of the fact that public policy favors making such
evidence available to the opponent in order that all
relevant evidence shall ultimately be placed before the
trier of fact. This in turn will insure that justice is
done. 3 0
These reasons are not convincing. The majority rule of the state
courts is correct in including the defendant's statement to his
insurer within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. The
defendant, in making his statement, has a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality. This expectation creates an important distinction
between a defendant's statement and those of witnesses and plaintiffs,
a distinction which the federal courts have failed to observe. Also, the
statement of the defendant is usually in his own words and contains
only his version of the facts. The agent of the insurer adds nothing to
the statement in the way of context. Therefore, the statement satisfies
all the prerequisites of the privilege 31' because it originates solely
with the defendant and is intended for transmission to an attorney
through the agency of the insurer. The attorney-client privilege has
always allowed the transmission of a confidential statement to an
attorney via an agent of the client. A contractual obligation to act as
the client's agent in transmitting the information to an attorney
should only emphasize the intended confidentiality of the statement.
Moreover, transmission through the insurer should not destroy
the confidentiality of the statement because the insurer with all of
its clerks, executives and officers acts as a "necessary party"'132 in
129. Gardner, supra note 46, at 364.
130. Allmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949); Jackson v.
Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 134 (N.D.W. Va. 1970); Gottlieb v.
Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C. 1959). In Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), it was said in regard to the attorney-client privilege:
There is nothing sacrosanct about it; it is a product of legislation,
without constitutional guarantee, and it is far from inviolate. Basically,
it is an expression of policy, sacrificing full disclosure for the considered
advantage of untrammeled attorney-client relations. It is not a boundless right, and its limits constantly shift.
Id. at 76.
131.
132.

WIGMORE, supra note 10.
In the case of intra-corporation communications, it is possible that the

communication-at least while en route to the house counsel-need be kept confidential only as between the corporation and the outside world. See United States v.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 4

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
communicating the information to the attorney. The "necessary
party" rule and the "dominant purpose" test are merely concessions
.to the practicalities of everyday life in a complicated legal environment. Nearly every motorist carries automobile liability insurance,
but not every motorist is in a position to insist on the addition or
deletion of clauses from the standard policy. Even if the insured was
aware of the problems posed here he would lack the bargaining
power to insist on specific methods of transmitting his statement to
an attorney. Through the terms of the insured's policy he contracts
with the insurer for the availability of an attorney in the event of
litigation and for the insurer's services as his agent in transmitting
information to the attorney selected. The insured is not in a position
to demand more.
A majority of the state courts are aware of this broadening of
the traditional attorney-client relationship, but they have realized
that the policy reasons behind the original privilege are applicable
to this situation. 133 One important policy consideration is that denial
of the privilege would create an adversary relationship between the
insurer and insured. This in turn would result in a reluctance on
the insured's part to disclose fully the facts of the accident to the
attorney. If the insured realizes that his statement will be revealed
to the adverse party, he will be less likely to give all the facts to the
insurer. As a result the insured may withhold facts which might
aid his attorney or allow the insurance company to settle out of
court, because he erroneously felt they were prejudicial.134 Here the
policy reasons for recognizing the privilege are just as significant as
in the traditional attorney-client relationship. Because automobile
liability insurance is litigation insurance, it is an "institutionalized" 35 substitute for the individualized attorney-client relationship.
In appropriate and parallel contexts it is entitled to a similar
protection.
While every evidentiary privilege excludes relevant information
and to that extent is a mixed good, the exclusion of information
contained in the defendant's statement is minimal. The original
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1958); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
R.C.A., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954).
133. People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197 N.E.2d 15 (1964).
134. Violation of the cooperation clause of his policy may allow the insurer to
avoid all liability. See note 61 supra.
135. Aldrich v. Catel Serv. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 16, 20, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582, 586
(1966).
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source of the information-the defendant himself-is usually s
available to testify as to the matters within his knowledge. Furthermore, the very existence of the privilege may enhance the confidence of the general public in the judicial process. If no privilege
was recognized, public respect for the judicial system would likely
be damaged by the frequent forced breach of the insured's reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
A balancing of the interests involved shows that the increased
respect for the judicial system, the protection of the insured's
reasonable expectations, and the need for recognizing this institutionalized form of the attorney-client relationship far outweigh the
harm resulting from a lack of full disclosure. Therefore, the
majority state court rule is correct in upholding the privilege in
regard to a defendant's statement given to the agent of his insurer
for possible transmission to an attorney in the event of litigation.
CONCLUSION

The contrasting state and federal court rules regarding the
discovery of a defendant's statement in an accident report situation
are based on two competing policy factors. On the one hand, the
federal courts are committed to the principle of open discovery. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate the legislative recognition
of the fact that public policy favors making such evidence available.
This in turn necessitates a narrow interpretation of the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. As a result the federal courts have
strictly adhered to the traditional scope of the privilege.
A divergent policy has been followed by the majority of state
courts. In seeking to protect the individual's reasonable expectation
of confidentiality these courts have broadened the scope of the attorney-client privilege while arguably staying within its traditional
frame work, that is, the agency theory and the necessary party rule.
Emphasizing the changing roles of attorney and client in today's
impersonal society, the state courts have pointed out that the
modern automobile insurance contract is simply an institutionalized form of the traditional attorney-client relationship. The state
courts have also noted that recognition of the privilege in the
accident report situation serves the same basic policy as recognition
of the privilege under more customary circumstances, that policy
being the promotion of full disclosure between attorney and client.
136. The author realizes that in criminal actions the defendant may avoid
testifying by exercising his fifth amendment privilege; the defendant in a civil
action may have died between the time of the accident and the time of the suit.
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Thus, while both the state and federal courts agree as to the
issues involved, each has selected a different policy factor as
controlling. Accordingly, until the time that the legislatures speak
clearly on the issue, the discovery of an insured's statement to his
insurer in an accident report situation will hinge directly on the
attorney's ability to argue policy in the face of a vague discovery
statute.
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